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Re-Imagining Justice 
Robin West· 
What do we mean by legal justice, as opposed to distributive, or social, or 
political justice; what is the justice, that is, we hope law promotes? What is the 
justice that lawyers and judges, peculiarly, are professionally committed to 
pursue? What is the virtue around which, arguably, this profession, and the 
individuals within it, have defined their public lives? 
Justice- and more particularly legal justice-is a badly under-theorized 
topic in jurisprudence; perhaps surprisingly. there is little written on it. 1 The 
paucity of writing of course has a history. It can be traced to the turn of the last 
century- formative years of legal pedagogy and legal curriculum-when legal 
formalists and legal realists, who disagreed on vinually everything else 
regarding law, oddly enough agreed on the need to sever law from moral 
philosophy and more generally from high culture. Formalists, so as to render 
law autonomous , deductively pure, "scientific," and resting on its own bottom, 
so to speak, and realists. so as to tie law to the prestige. aspirations. and 
methods of the then nascent but ascending SOCial sciences. Both realists and 
formalists, albeit for different reasons, sought to disassociate law from the 
demands of religIOn, morals, or culture, generally from the Toquevillian 
aristocratic norms within which law had bcen nested in the pre-Classical era. 
Justice, the great fanna li st Christopher Langdell thought, was not a fit subject 
of thought for a rigorous and professional and scientific law school 
curriculum. 2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, the father of legal realism, quite 
famously, was even harsher . . "I hate justice," Holmes wrote. "I know that if a 
man begins to talk about that, for one reason or anOlher he is shirking thinking 
III legal terms.") At least in the legal academy, we have indeed taken the 
Holmesian admonition to hean. Fearful of appearing sentimental, childish, or, 
worst of ali, ignorant of the law, twentieth century lawyers and legal scholars, 
• Professor of Law, GeorgelOwn University Law Center. 
1. The best shon treatment is David Luban, Legal Jus/ice, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JURISPRUDENCE 
AND LEGAL THEORY (1st cd., 2001). 
2. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Lnngdell's Orlho(/oxy, 4S U. PITT. L REv. 1,6-12 (1983) 
(describing Langdell's vision of the law school curriculum). 
3. Lcuer from Olivcr We ndell Holmes 10 Dr. Wu, in OUVER WENDELL HOLMES: Hrs BOOK 
NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED PAPERS 201 (H. Shriver cd ., 1936). 
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with only a few exceptions,4 have forsook the work of elucidating the concept 
of legal Justice. 
Holmes and Langdellian skepticism notwithstanding, one can quite easily 
discern a conventional, and largely uncriticized, tum-of-the-century 
understanding of legal justice, inside the academy and the profession, It finds 
oratorical expression in law day and graduation day speeches, in the major 
unspoken premises of countless conventional legal arguments, and in some, 
although again not much, jurisprudential scholarship. That conception--cail it 
the dominant or conventional conception-I will argue below, is seriously 
flawed. More specifically, I want to suggest that it is seriously flawed in a way 
that directly and negatively affects feminist and progressive efforts at achieving 
political reform. Feminists and progressives need to take up the task of 
criticizing our conventional understanding of legal justice. More importantly, 
we need to take up the task of crafting alternatives. 
Let me begin by specifying what I take the dominant conception to be. 
Legal justice- by which I mean here the virtue that specifically informs, 
constrains, or guides law, legal practice, and adjud ication---consists of(at least) 
three separate commitments. First, the justice to which we conventionally 
aspire in law consists of a commitment to---and therefore an understanding 
of- the "Rule of Law." Lawyers take extraordinary pride in the Rule of Law, 
and routinely connect it, in law day speeches or graduation speeches, with the 
virtuc of Icgal justice. The case may be different with othcr sorts of justice, but 
legal justice, we might, and often do say, is only possible within a pre-
commitment to the Rule of Law. Put differently, the justice to which we are 
conunitted as lawyers is the justice produced by fidelity to law. So to 
understand the virtue of justice, we must understand the point of the Rule of 
Law. 
Second, legal justice requires adherence to some recognizable regime of 
rights. Rights, to borrow from Ronald Dworkin's formulation, are the means 
by which justice is secured in law; they are the metaphorical bridge from the 
moral ought to the legal imperative.5 Rights- justified by reference to our 
moral nature, and then consequentially constraining what the state mayor may 
not do---are, no less than the rule of law, necessary to legal justice. H may not 
always or everywhere be so--other societies, for example, may organize their 
institutional commitment to justice around a scheme of duty, or a faith-based 
identity-but here and now, in this culture, we achieve justice through 
recognizing and then enforcing our rights. To understand legal justice requires 
an understanding of the rights to which we are entitled. 
4. Richard Posner's identification of legal justice with the maximization of wealth and Ronald 
Dworkin's identification of legal justice with integrity arc the two prominent exceptions. See generally 
RONALD DWORKIN. LAW'S EMPIRE(1986); RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). 
5. See RONALD DWORXJN. Tnking Rights Seriously, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 
(1977). 
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Third. and perhaps mosl obviously, according to the conventional 
conception, legal justice requires a commitment 10 some version of the rule of 
precedent-legal justice, for most lawyers, is the moral mandate to treat like 
cases alike, nothing more, but more importantly, nothing less. To do legal 
justice means, in essence, to decide cases according to rules. To decide cases 
according to rules in tum requires that likes be treated alike, and unlikes be 
rethought until their similarities with some pre-existing pattern are identified, 
and then likewise treated alike. 6 The virtue of legal justice requires a 
commitment to this moral mandate. 
Each of these commitments- the Rule of Law, rights, and the Rule of 
Precedent---obviously requires interpretation. The dominant conception of 
legal justice consists not just of the ideals themselves, but also of particular 
understandings of the Rule of Law, of the nature of rights, and of precedent. 
My critical point, consequently, is this: the conventional understandings or 
interpretations of these three jurisprudential ideas- ideas about the nature of 
the Rule of Law, the nature of rights, and the nature of the Rule of Precedent-
are not very good interpretations of those three ideals. But, as bad ideas go, 
they also have considerable power, particularly in law schools. These days, 
they blanket the legal academy. They have force, all the more so for being 
relatively unexamined. 
Let me take them up in the order laid out above. First, the Rule of Law. 
What does it mean to live in a society governed by the Rule of Law? Why do 
those who live in one seemingly take such pride in it? It could of course mean 
many quite different thmgs- and has meant many different things. The 
contemporary, now dominant, interpretation that I want to highlight is only one 
possible interpretation among many, but it IS one that resonates broadly these 
days among law students, perhaps in part because it neatly echoes one presently 
popular version of this country's mythological history. On this view, the 
purpose of the Rule of Law is to shield both the individual and the community 
from the brunt of overly personal, tyrannical, whimsical, brutal, or "naked" 
politics. It is the Rule of Law that distinguishes legality from tyralUly; the 
orderly and benign control of the social behavior of free men by rules from the 
whimsical, or worse, command over individuals by unchecked and unduly 
personal authority. Legalism-the very idea of law- shields us, in effect, from 
the excesses of unadorned political power. Law is power's antidote. Law is 
the antithesis of politics; law constrains, counters, and cabins politics. What we 
ask of law, on this accounting, what we tum to it to do, is to protect us from the 
ambitions of an overweening, zealous, at best unduly paternalistic and at worst 
sadistic, but always freedom-sapping, state. We organize authority in lawful 
fonns so as to emasculate particular power holders or seekers; we establish law 
6. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029,1037 (1 990). 
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to frustrate the wi ll to power. 7 By so doing, we free individuals to act, and to 
act in ways that are unpolluted by power. The underlying psychic parable of 
this understanding of law's essential appeal is Freudian: Brothers unite to 
overthrow the powerful and personal father and then establish in his place 
totemic, rather than personal, authority.s The fictional literature spawned In 
this century by the appeal of this vision-law as that which vanquishes power, 
and power, simply, as that which kills- is immense and known to all of us 
from young adulthood. Think, perhaps foremost, of the lawlessness of the 
political dictatorship of Oceania in George Orwell's dystopic classic /984.9 
The prominence of this understanding of law's essence-that law and the 
Rule of Law is that which protects individual freedom from political 
overreach- unites and perhaps partly explains a good deal of contemporary 
constitutional law, It provides the unstaled major premise of particular 
interpretations of quite general constitutional phrases, It is a view of law as the 
antithesis of power, for example, that has driven the Court over the last twenty 
years to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection 
of the law" as severely constraining the political power of slates from taking 
even modest affmnative steps toward eradicating the effects of racism, rather 
than as virtually requiring it to do so, A state acting in such an overtly political 
way, the Court has reasoned, is a far greater danger to individua l freedom than 
the private racial stratification that a state so acting might thereby seek to 
ameliorate_'o If the "Rule ofT.aw," and hence "Constitutional T.aw," exists so 
as to limit, or mute, or muzzle politics, then surely the point of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is to limit, mute, and muzzle political voice, Similarly, and more 
specifically. it is this view of the Rule of Law, and Its relation to public and 
private power, that underlies the view, now widely shared among right wing 
political and legal think tanks, the current Supreme Court, and I think most 
7. See. e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L REv. 1175, 1180 
(1989). 
8. SIGMU:>"D FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO: RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN THE PSYCHIC LIVES OF 
SAVAGES AND NEUROTICS (A.A. Brill lrans., Vintagc Books 1918)(1918). 
9. GWRGEORWELL, 1984(1949). 
10. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.s. 469, 490-92 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(arguing that the city's affirmalive action plan for minority-owned construction businesses failed 
constitutional strict SCTlltiny because the city did not demonstrate with enough specificity lhat the plan 
remedied past racial discrimination; thus. the government had no compelling intercst in upholding it, and 
the plan itself was not 5ufliciently narrowly tailored). For critical commentary, see Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: 71Je Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 54-56 
(1989); Anthony E. Cook, The Temptnlion and the Fall of Original Understanding, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
1163. 1194-96 (book review); Richard Dc:lgado, Playing Favorites, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1223 ( 1996): 
Charles R. Lawrence, III , The £pidemialogy of Color-Blindness: Learning 10 Think and Talk About 
Race, Again, 15 RC. THIRD WORLD LJ. 1 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J ,A. 
Croson Co. : The Backlash AgoilUl Affirmative AClion, 64 TuL. L REv. 1609 (1990); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Constitutional Scholars ' Simement on Afjirmlltive Action Ajler City of Richmond v. fA. Croson Co., 98 
YALE L.J. 1711 (1989); Patricia J . Williams, Comment: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in 
Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1990); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The FUlureofAjJirmlltive 
AClion: Recloiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1996). 
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ominously, the supposedly liberal editorial page afthe Washi1lgton Post, that a 
substantial part of the Congressional "Violence Against Women Act" 
(VAWA), passed in 1994, is unconstitutionaL II That Act, on this view, is itself 
a greater threat to freedom than is the actual, demonstrated unchecked violence 
against women that the law seeks to remedy. Thus, V A WA is precisely the sort 
of target at which the Constitution is aimed, and the act is accordingly 
unconstitutional. It is this reading of the Rule of Law, to take two final 
examples, that, at the turn of the last century, regarded the threat to freedom 
posed by minimum wage laws as a greater danger to individual freedom than 
the threat posed to individual survival by sub-minimum wages, and hence 
regarded those laws as unconstitutional. At the tum of this century, proponents 
of this same reading regard the greatest threat to free speech as emanating from 
innocuous campus and university speech codes, rather than from cross 
burnings, gay-bashing, or the vandalizing of menorahs on those same 
campuses, or for that matter the control of infonnation by a handful of media 
elites, or the control of elections by economic elites. It is, in short, this 
understanding of law's essence that drives so many- including the current 
Supreme Court- to regard the idea of law itself, and hence the Constitution and 
the rights that law guarantees, as inexorably limiting rather than enabling, 
guiding or requiring congressional political action. It is this view of the point 
of the Rule of Law that posits a Constitution ever sensitive to the threat to 
freedom posed by an over-zealous state, and ever willfully blind to the threat to 
freedom, security, and community posed first by private fratricide, intimidation 
or subordination, and then by a quiet state and muzzled politics, that blithely 
acquiesces--or indeed gives aid-to private spheres of humiliation and fear. It 
is this view of the Rule of Law that makes this understanding of the 
Constitution seem natural, inevitable, and desirable, not just to the polilical 
right, but to a generation now of "apolitical" law students and lawyers. 
It is also this view of the Rule of Law that constitutes at this point in our 
history a serious threat to progressive politics, and feminist politics in 
particular. The "politics" contemplated and paranoically feared by Rule of Law 
zealotry is demonized prec isely because it is regarded, on this account, as 
thoroughly meaningless-necessarily, and essentially so . Politics is Dionysian, 
undisciplined, furious, and vengeful-in short, female; law, by contrast, is 
Apollonian, orderly, rule-like, rational, merciful, and male. The Ru le of Law 
embodies the latter so as to constrain the former. A Rule of Law that fears 
politics, and that crafts a Constitution to disable politics does so because of the 
latter's essential, irredeemable irrationality: Politics, in this view, and the will 
to power to which politics gives voice, springs inexorably from a poisoned well 
11 . United States Y. Murrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Editorial: S/(f/es ' Susiness, WASH. POST, May 
16.2000, at A20. SuI see Peter M. Shane. In Whose Best Inlerest? Not the States·, WASH. POST, May 
21,2000, at 85 (criticizing both the decision and \he PQst·s editorial) . 
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of emboldened malignancy-think of the Furies, in Aeschylus 's Oresleia, and 
remember their fate, once Apollo and Athena step in and impose the Rule of 
LaW. 12 Power, hence politics, just is the utterly meaningless thirst to dominate. 
This impassioned, irrational, political urge, perhaps, cannot be vanquished, hut 
its expression and force can be, and it is the role of Law-general, abstract, 
Apolloman, pure and apolitical- to do so. Rule of Law idolatry threatens the 
development of a feminist politics, because it poses politics itself as the threat 
with which law must reckon. 
Second: On rights. Central to our now-dominant understanding of the 
virtue oflegal justice is a particular conception of lights, or rather, a particular 
conception of the aspects of human nature protected, through rights, against 
unwise state encroachment. On this view, what we do and should protect, 
through rights, is the individual's heroic will: It is the individual's freedom to 
assert his will in whatever ways that he individually or idiosyncratically 
desires, unimpeded by noxious community and communitarian constraints, that 
is protected by rights. Thus, what is protected is my right to think, act, 
co.nlract, express myself, own property, maintain privacy, amass wealth, and 
enjoy my possessIOns against malign, meddling, or irrational state 
infringement. The individual is protected, Constitutionally, against such 
mfringements of his rights, and he is so protected because of a particular 
understanding of who we are: We are individuals whose essential being is best 
realized through unencumbered and counter-<:ommunitarian acts of 
individualistic will. It is that individual, the heroically willful individual, who 
is protected through a regime of rights. 
This conception of rights, as scores of left-wing rights critics of the past 
thirty years have pointed out, is clearly hostile to efforts to address, through 
politics, private sphere subordination-whether dIat subordination occurs along 
race, gender or class lines.13 It is this conception of rights, after all, that was 
expressed in the majority decision in Dred Scott,I4 protecting the rights of the 
slaveowner, no less than in Lochfler,15 protecting the rights of freely willing 
employers and employees, and likewise in a growing number of articles of the 
last five years, bemoaning the constitutional threat to the First Amendment 
posed by the protection of women against the hostile atmosphere created by 
verbal sexual harassment on the job. 16 More subtly however, although in my 
12. AESCHYLUS, THE EUMENIDES 146 (Richmood Lattimore trans .• University of Chicago 1953) 
(458 B.C.). 
13. See. e.g., Mary E. Becker, The Politics 0/ Women·s Wrongs nnd the Bill 0/ "Rights ": A 
Bicentennial Perspecti\!e, S9 U. CHI. L. REv. 453 (1992); Morton J. HorwiLZ, Rights , 23 HAltv. C.R.-
C.L L. REv. 393 (1988); Mark Tushnet, An Essnyon Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363 (1984). 
14 . Drcd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
15. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 4S (1905). 
16. See, e.g. , Kingsley R. Browne, An E\!olutionnry Perspecti\!e on Sexunl Hnrassmenl: Seeking 
Rools in Biology Rather Than Ideology. 8 1. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 5 (1997); Kingsley R. Browne, 
Workplace Censorship: A Response /0 Professor Sangree, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 579 (1995); Kingsley R. 
Browne, Title VI! as Censorship: Hostile·Environment Harmsmenl nnd the First Amendment, 52 OHIO 
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view just as important, this particular view of rights is hostile to efforts to use 
rights to protect aspects of our being that don't fit the heroically · willful mold; 
thus, the problem posed for progressive and feminist politics by the right-wing 
understanding of rights, and the individual protected through them, is not just 
the occasional head-ta-head conflict between individual rights so understood, 
and political antisubordinationist needs. The further damage is the neglect of 
other aspects of our natures which might be in need of rights. 
To take an example: The dominant conception of rights stands as a serious 
obstacle to the nascent feminist efforts now underway by a number of feminist 
legal theorists, such as Martha Fineman,l1 some journalists, such as Deborah 
Stone,18 some moral philosophers, including Eva Kittay,19 and some liberal 
theorists, such as Linda McClain,lO to construct meaningful and enforceable 
"rights of care," by which I mean rights that might aim to protect female or 
male caregivers against the vulnerabilities they sustain when engaged in 
caregiving labor in the private sphere. Rights of care, as envisioned by these 
thinkers, if we had them or if they were recognized, might protect caregivers 
against unwise state action, such as the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act,21 or entitle caregivers to state support, such as 
through a more ambitious Family and Medical Leave Act. 22 Obviously. we 
don't presemly have such rights, and even imagining such rights will no doubt 
prove to be arduous labor. One reason (among others) for the difficulty, is 
squarely ideological: The "rights of care" that are needed by caregivers are 
needed not so much to protect individualistic. heroIc, independent acts of will. 
Rather, they are needed to protect vulnerabilities brought on by our 
relationality, our mutual dependency, and our interdependency. And they are 
justified, in tum, not by the liberation of industry, genius, invention, or artistry 
faciliated by the unencumbered individual heroic will, but rather, by the 
ST. LJ. 481 (1991): Ju les B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hos/ile Environment: A Primer on Free 
Speech and Sexual Haranment, 69 NOTRE DA.\1E L. REv. 1003 (1993); Eugene Volokh. What Speech 
Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harnssment Law Restrict? 86 OEO. L.J. 627 (1997); Eugene 
Volokh, Debate: Thinking Ahead About Freedom o[Speech (lnd Hostile Work Environment H(lrassment, 
17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305 (1996): Eugene Volokh, Comment: Freedom of Speech and 
Workpl(lce Harassmenl, 39 UCLA L REv . 1791 (1992). See genemlfy Nadine Slrossen, The Tensions 
Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the FirsE Amendment: No Trump. 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 70 1 (1995). 
17. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SexUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). 
18. Deborah Stone, Why We Need a Care Movement. THE NATION, Mar. 13,2000, at 13. 
19. EVA FEOER KIlTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 
(1998). 
20. Linda McClain, Care (IS II Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources. alld 
Republicanism, 76 CHl.-KENT L REv. 1673 (2001). 
21 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-
193,110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scaltered seclions of7 U.S.c., 8 U.S.c., 21 U.S.C.,2S 
U.s.C., and 42 U.S.c.). 
22. Family and Medical Leave Actor 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., S U.S.c., and 29 U.S.c.). 
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nurtured, healthful maturation and care thai such labor ensures. But these 
hypothesized rights, perhaps needless to say, ill -fit our liberal understandings. 
We have rights, on the dominant view, to be free of obligation, of duty, and of 
dependency. and we have those rights because we are, essentially. creatures 
whose essence is best expressed not through relational acts of care that nurture 
and protect vulnerable others, but rather, through robust acts of independence, 
of defiance, and of individualistic trailblazmg-acts that defy, not cement, our 
es!.entiai connections with others. 
Third, our dominant understanding of legal justice is constituted by a 
particular understanding of the moral mandate, felt at some level by all actors 
in the judicial system, of horizontal equity: the imperative to "treat likes alike," 
or to follow precedent, or to comply with slare decisis. What is behind this 
mandate? The dominant conception has embraced two of the salient 
possibilities: first, we might insist on legal justice---on treating like cases 
alike-because we view such a mandate as an important bridge to the past: as a 
way of maintaining faith with ancestral wisdom, as a way of preserving 
traditions, as a way of forg ing a commonality between who we are as a 
community and who we have been as a community.23 Second, we might insist 
on legal justice---on treating like cases alike-because such consistency and 
predictability is essential to the end of maximizing human liberty: By knowing 
with some certainty what and when the legal leviathan will impose itself upon 
me I can more freely order my own affairs, and the rule of precedent, or stare 
decisis. or the mandate to treat likes alike, furthers that certainty.24 Thus, legal 
justice, as we presently understand it, serves the ends of traditionahsm (or 
social conservatism) and libertarianism (or economic conservatism) quite 
nicely. 
This understanding of formal, or horizontal, equity is also an obstacle to 
specificall y feminist visions of politics and political reform. To combat 
subordination, there must be a breach, not relentless continuity, with our bonds 
to the past-at which time subordination was entrenched, and entrenched in the 
very traditions that legal justice and stare decisis so vigorously promote. And 
to either combat subordination or protect the work of caregiving, we must from 
time to time interfere with, rather than relentlessly honor, the liberty that comes 
from our certainty regarding the legal leviathan. A conception of legal justice 
that seeks to further either traditional patterns of social life or libertarian 
understandings of human well-being will not be well suited to the ends or 
means of progressive political visions. There will emerge, then, if these 
conceptions go unchallenged, a quite deep antithesis between the conservative 
idea of law, as reflected in understandings of formal justice, and the very idea 
of progressive political reform. 
2] . Kronman , supra note 6. 
24. !d. at 10]7-39. 
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These ideas-ideas centering on the meaning of the Rule of Law, the 
content and purpose of our rights, and the moral mandate of horizontal 
equity-constitute the dominant conception of the vinue of legal justice. They, 
or something like them, dominate law day speeches and commencement 
addresses. But they are more than ornamental. They also undergird large 
chunks of constitutional argument-the Constitution is our highest Law, and 
the point of Law is to constrain and tame politics , and politics is what 
sovereigns produce- thus the point of the Constitution IS to forbid certain 
outcomes by the political branches. The Constitution exists so as to frustrate 
rather than facilitate political solutions to soc1al problems. They are also, all 
three of them, full of contradictions, enough contradictions to absorb the 
attention and energies of several generations of energetic deconstructionists. 
At the same time, however, they should not be undersold. They are, first, ideas. 
They are not simply preferences, stakes, or political parries. They have been a 
long time in the making; they have a lineage. They have an internal coherence, 
contradictions notwithstanding. They also, importantly, resonate with our 
mythological national history. They speak to the fears we have, rightly or 
wrongly, of over-bearing paternalism, communism, imperialism, states-nm-
amok, children or madmen or fundamentalist zealots or sadists at the helm of 
state. They also echo our dreams, and hopes, ill -placed or not, of unfettered 
liberty, of freedom being, happily, just another word for nothing left to lose, of 
breaking away, to borrow from the title of Lina Wertmuller'!; famous film, of 
our imagined essence being a function of the mark we each heroically and quite 
individually leave on our world. 
To summarize: This ideological tripod- an interpretation of the Rule of 
Law, an understanding of Rights, and an explanation of the moral mandate of 
formal equality---<:onstitutes a widely shared understanding of Legal Justice, 
which is both facially apolitical (these are ideas about law, after all, not about 
politics) but which also render natural, or neutral, legal conclusions that are 
inimical to a feminist or progressive politics. What to do about it? There are 
three options. One is to demonstrate the politics behind the claim of political 
neutrality. This has been the idee fixe of the critical legal studies movement 
now for over thirty years, and to make a long story short, not much has come of 
it. The second possibility is to point out the arguably central contradictions 
behind each leg of the tripod. A good bit of feminist and critical and left 
scholarship has gone into this project: The understanding of the Rule of Law 
recited above rests 011 a glaring and illogical leap of faith from the fact of a 
written word to the ghostlike dream of a government of laws rather than 
persons; the idea of a right as essentially a negative protection against state 
intervention into the private is belied by the existence of the criminal law itself, 
which positively protects us- although some more than others-against private 
maldistributions of physical power; and the mandate to treat likes alike is so 
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thoroughly riddled with exceptions, given the need to accommodate history and 
difference both, that it is problematized by virtually all serious doctrinal as well 
as theoretical legal scholarship of almost all stripes. There is, though, a third 
possible critica l response, and that is to rewimagine. 
We need a progressive jurisprudence-a jurisprudence that embraces rather 
than resists, and then fe-interprets, our liberal commitment to the "rule of law," 
the content of our individual rights, and the dream of formal equality. More 
im.lusive interpretations-more generous re~imaginings--could then undergird, 
and in a principled way, particular constitutional arguments. Rather than 
relentlessly buck, deconstruct, or vilify the seeming "naturalness" of legal 
arguments premised on moral premises, we ought to be providing such 
premises, and natural and general arguments of our owo. But first we need to 
re·tmagme. 
Let me suggest some possible contrasts, starting with the Rule of Law. 
Contrast the understanding of the Rule of Law suggested above- m which the 
point of law is to frustrate, mute, muffle, politics-with a second and quite 
different understanding of both law's promise and the evi l at which it is 
directed. On this alternative conception, the point or essence of law is to 
construct, rather than frustrate, the realm of politics. It is to nurture rather than 
stifle a public sphere within which our political natures find expression. The 
hOITor of lawlessness, on this view, finds dystopic expression not 10 the 
totalitarian imaginings of Orwell. but rather. in the equally parabolic young-
adult masterpiece Lord o/the Flies.25 In Golding's dystopic vision, recall, it is 
the absence of a political state-not an ail-tao-powerful one- that gives rise to 
the domination of some and the subordination of others through fratricidal and 
infantile violence. The fear we counter with the hope of law, on this view, is 
not our fear of an overly powerful state, but rather, our fear of an impotent, 
absent, emasculated, or neglectful state, and the tribal, fraternal, or inter. 
familial warfare to which the absence of political authority would give rise. Put 
positively, the utopian alternative to fratricide that we attempt to construct 
tluough law, is not so much the unleashing of free individual choice unfettered 
by an oppressive state. but the necessary conditions of cooperative community 
life. Law, and the point of the Rule of Law, on this view, is not to frustrate 
politics, but to enable it. And politics, on this view, is not the dictatorial or 
totalitarian Orwellian nightmare, or the lethal war of all against all, but rather 
the antithesis of both; it is the means by which communities and individuals 
create meaning. 
If that is the point of law, then it is also in some way the point of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to guarantee not only 
equality, but also equal protection of the law. If that's right, then the Rule of 
Law so understood points unequivocally toward the constitutionality, indeed 
25 . WILLIAM GOi .. OING, LORD Of THE FLIES (1954). 
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the constitutional necessity, of the Violence Against Women Act, as well as the 
Brady Bill , as well as other forms of gun legislation. If the point of law is to 
police against private violence, as Thomas Hobbes urged some time ago,26 then 
the Constitution, and surely the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
Clause, must exist in part to ensure that this protection against violence is 
granted equally. If that is right, then the constitutionality of V A WA, I think, 
fo llows inexorably. And- it is right. It is the basic point of law, and hence of 
the Rule of Law, to police against private violence. Hobbes had that exactly 
right. And it is most assuredly the point of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection clause, to ensure that protection is granted equally. 
Likewise, rather than abandoning rights- throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater-we need to rethink, jurisprudentially, the understanding of who we 
are and what we are that underlies the dominant understandings of rights. We 
are not only beings whose essence is realized through heroic acts of 
independent will. We are also parents and grandparents and children of parents 
and grandparents whose essence is realized through acts of care that protect 
those dependent upon us and give meanings to our lives by virtue of so doing. 
Those caring acts that emanate from us and that are bestowed upon us are not 
only necessary for our individual and collective survival, but they are also the 
soil in which our moral and most human selves are rooted. They are also, 
developmentally, essential conditions for the flowering of the individualist 
spirit so ceic:bl<lted by both liberal and right wing jurists, and fitfully protected 
by liberal rights. Perhaps we do, as liberal and libertarian philosophers and 
Jurists of the last five hundred years have urged, need rights to protect our 
individuality-to protect our freedoms of thought, speech, religion, property, 
an? contract. No less vitally, however, we need rights that we currently lack: 
We need rights that protect our ability and will to care for the weak among us, 
and to nurture them to health, and to care for the young, and bring them to 
responsible maturity, and to comfort and care for the elderly and ease the 
burdens of age. We need such rights of care not only, and not even primarily, 
to protect those activities against an overweening state. We need those rights to 
valOrize and honor this fundamental aspect of our being. We need such rights 
so as to goad to action- not inaction--community and state support for those 
essential and essentially interdependent spheres of social life. 
And finally, we need to re-imagine the point of the mandate of legal 
justice. The "moral point" of the mandate to treat likes alike, much authority to 
the contrary notwithstanding, may be, at hean, neither to protect tradition nor 
liberty. The point of treating likes alike may rather be rooted in a universalist 
and humanistic inclination to define the human community broadly- to 
envision a community that includes all, and includes all because of a 
recognitIOn of shared humanity. This cosmopolitan vision of the mandate of 
26. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 120-21, 153-54 (Richard Tuck cd., 1996) ( 1651). 
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legal justice as well, of course, has difficulties, both conceptual and moral , but 
it is nevertheless one which would not be at heart hostile to feminist and 
progressive aspirations. It would strive for and stress both inclusiveness and 
respect for difference. It would seek a large rather than constrained 
community; its impulse is toward a global as we ll as local acknowledgement of 
duty and responsibility. If accepted, it would align law, the idea of law, and the 
idea of legal justice, not with the traditions of the best or the economic liberty 
of individual and corporations, but rather, with the hopes for a conununity of 
world citizens. It would align law, legal justice, lawyers, and lawyering 
professionally, with a recognition that the universal human rights of women, as 
of ali, are grounded in a shared humanity and ultimately a shared fate. It would 
align the idea of law and the ideals of law with the feminist politics of the 
greatest moment, the struggle to secure basic rights for those women both here 
and abroad who lack them, because they are regarded as both different from 
and less than some shared human essence. 27 
To summarize, in my view, our dominant conception of the virtue of legal 
justice has at its core a set of ideas: particular interpretive understandings of the 
point of the Rule of Law, the nature of rights, and the meaning of precedent. 
They are not very good ideas. They are full of contradictions and they are 
ungenerous in the extreme. But we ignore them at our peri l. Ideas do matter, 
to repeat a cliche, and bad ideas wi ll win out, if there is no counter. There 
presently isn ' t much of one. We need and don't have a progressive 
jurisprudence-a conception of the point of the Rule of Law, of Rights, and of 
fonnal or legal justice- that is respectful of the needs, ambitions, aspirations 
and- yes-the natures of heretofore not tenibly well-respected women, 
children, animals and men. We don ' t have such a conception, and we don't 
have it, in part , because we have grown distrustful of the project: distrustful of 
the ideals of the Rule of Law, of the punishing and anti-womanist hidden 
implications in the idea of rights, of the not so well-hidden dangers in a 
backward looking and backward regarding understanding of legal Justice. But 
we have lived without a conception of justice fo r long enough now to see the 
damage that skepticism has wrought. We need to not only deconstruct so as to 
expose the hidden politics of dominant conceptions of justice; we need to 
construct or re-imagine alternat ives with care. 
27. J argue this at greater length in Robin West, b rhe Rule o/Law Cosmopolitan?, 19 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REv. 259 (2000). 
